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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the Master of Science (MSc) in Banking and 
Finance at the International Hellenic University.  
 
This research provides an introduction to Behavioral Finance and empirically 
investigates sentiment captured by the well-known VIX index (the fear index) in the 
US stock exchange. As expected by previous literature, a negative relationship 
between the fear index and the stock market index is documented along with the 
asymmetric relationship of the VIX index and the S&P500 index from January 2000 
to October 2019. Moreover, in order to further elaborate on the relationship between 
fear and stock market sub-periods are examined to cover the period before, during and 
after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
 
The empirical results provide recent evidence to general asymmetry in the reaction of 
the fear index to the stock market returns.  In fact, it seems that the estimated negative 
asymmetric relationship was strong before the global financial crisis and became even 
stronger after the global financial crisis. This study indicates the significant role of 
investor sentiment in the investment environment especially during crisis periods and 
provides useful results for market participants.   
 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the people who 
supported me during my Master in Banking and Finance; my appreciation to my 
supervisor, Dr. Fotini Economou for her precious assistance. Moreover I would like to 
thank all of my professors. Lastly I would like to thank my family for the whole 
support.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Human psychology clearly drives the economy as well as the capital markets. 
Behavioral finance is a combination of psychology, sociology as well as 
maximization of profits (Shiller, 2003), and its purpose is to recognise and understand 
why people make specific financial decisions that eventually directly affect the capital 
markets. The individual characteristics of market participants systematically affect 
others’ investment decisions as well as market outcomes. According to Qawi (2010), 
Behavioral Finance is a field of finance that employs psychology theories in order to 
explain anomalies that occur in the stock market.  
 
Behavioral Finance is based on cognitive psychology and examines the way that 
people think and organize available information. There is empirical evidence which 
shows that people make systematically mistakes. For instance, they prefer more 
familiar options and as a result people believe that domestic equities are better known 
and more difficult to experience losses. But familiar equity does not mean safe, as 
investors perhaps ignore information that will prevent them from bad decisions. 
  
On the other hand, traditional finance considers that traders are rational and take into 
account all the available information in the decision making process. As a 
consequence the capital markets are efficient and reflect all available information in 
the price of securities (Suryawanshi and Jumle, 2016).   
 
In the last five decades, the difficulty to understand how the economy works has 
increased. The efficient market hypothesis is questioned, as the cornerstone 
hypothesis of rationality cannot explain the unprecedented volatility of returns and 
trading volume observed in the most of the international markets both in developed 
and emerging countries. For this reason, besides rational expectations, many 
researchers take into consideration beliefs as well as investor sentiment, as 
explanatory variables.  
 
An old saying in Wall Street says that the market is driven by two emotions: fear and 
greed. In fact, fear seems to be an unpleasant and strong emotion of anticipation or 
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awareness of danger (Webster, 2019). It is observed more intensively during times of 
financial crisis that capital markets become more fearful overall, and costly, as stocks 
present large losses for long periods.  
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between the US fear index and the stock 
market index, i.e. the VIX index and the S&P500 index, from January 2000 to 
October 2019 in order to better understand investor fear in the capital markets, before, 
during and after the global financial crisis. The empirical results provide useful 
information for market participants, for example retail and institutional investors, 
while the investor sentiment presence might move asset prices away from their fair 
values and could even lead to irrational exuberance and bubbles results.  
 
The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review on Behavioral Finance and on the relationship of the fear index with the stock 
market returns. Section 3 presents the employed dataset and the research approach. 
Section 4 provides the empirical results and Section 5 concludes and discusses some 
ideas for future research. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 A brief introduction to Behavioral Finance 
 
Traditional or standard finance focuses on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
and the Markowitz portfolio theory (1952). In the Efficient Market Hypothesis the 
correct values are generated by investors who seek for abnormal profits. Respectively, 
Markowitz portfolio theory assumes that investors try to obtain the highest return 
possible with the minimum risk. According to Baker and Nofsinger (2010), all 
institutions, markets and financial participants are rational and they make unbiased 
decisions in order to maximize their self-interests and in case someone makes a 
suboptimal decision he might leave the market or learn from his poor outcomes.  
 
On the other hand, Behavioral Finance tends to explain investors’ decisions and 
reactions taking into consideration the emotional process and in which degree it has 
an impact in the decision-making process (Ricciardi and Simon, 2000). According to 
Shefrin (2000), behavioral finance is an interaction of psychology with the financial 
performance where “a mistake of one investor could be profits for another investor”. 
 
Even though in the middle of 1990s Behavioral Finance systematically appeared in 
academic literature, it was also present before that. MacKay in 1841 published the 
“Extraordinary Popular and the Madness of Crowds” where, for the first time, many 
behavioral aspects of financial markets were presented. In 1995 Statman and Shefrin 
had leaded the research of Behavioral Finance, writing an extensive investigation of 
Behavioral Finance and standard finance. Tversky and Kahneman (1979) described 
and provided the foundation for behavioral finance heuristics. They presented 
prospect theory for decision-making under risk using also rules of thumb or mental 
shortcuts that help investors make decisions more easily and quickly.  
 
Shefrin (2000) categorized biases in two types: heuristic driven biases and frame 
dependent biases. He also realized that investors, economists and everyone involved 
in the financial markets tend to use rules of thumb and/or heuristics in order to 
evaluate available data and make decisions. Taking a closer look into the most 
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important behavioral biases, Festinger, Riecken and Schachter (1956), firstly 
introduced the theory of cognitive dissonance, which depicts an unpleasant sentiment 
that investors try to avoid by changing their own beliefs. Cognitive psychology has 
been examined also by Raiffa (1968), analyzing decisions in three approaches, i.e. 
normative, descriptive, prescriptive. The normative approach concerns the process of 
rational decision-making. It provides the ideal solution to be achieved by a decision-
making process. Moreover, the descriptive approach deals with how people in real-
life situations actually make choices. Lastly, the prescriptive approach presents 
practical recommendations and tools to individuals that could help them to achieve 
results which are closely aligned with the normative analysis. 
 
Pompian (2011) categorized behavioral biases into cognitive and emotional biases.  
Cognitive biases contain for example, overconfidence, mental accounting, 
representativeness bias, familiarity bias, etc. On the other hand, there are the 
emotional biases that are related to investor sentiment; it is more difficult to identify 
them as many times they appear in a combination. Emotional biases include for 
instance, loss aversion, optimism bias, pessimism bias, regret aversion, herding, etc.  
 
Taking a closer look into some well-known behavioral biases: 
 
 Mahajan (1992) presents firstly the overconfidence as “an overestimation of 
the probabilities for a set of events”. In general, humans have the tendency to 
overestimate their own skills and predictions of success. Odean (1998) 
referred in overconfidence as the tendency of investors to overestimate the 
accuracy of their knowledge about the value of a security. Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998), claim that investors’ overconfidence leads into a 
negative serial correlation in prices. Barber and Odean (2000), present that 
investors’ overconfidence increases their trading activity, resulting in higher 
trading costs that reduce their wealth. Last but not least, Gervais and Odean 
(2001), present that past trading success creates overconfidence resulting in 
higher trading volume in the future. 
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 Thaler (1999) defined mental accounting as the bias to categorize the 
expenditures in different/independent mental accounts. In this case investors 
do not take into consideration the correlation among individual assets and this 
has important implications for portfolio diversification.   
 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1972) explain that the representativeness heuristic is 
used to assess the probability of an occurrence under uncertainty. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982) present that when people are based on representativeness to 
make decisions, most of the times they do mistakes, due to the fact that there if 
something is more representative it does not necessarily mean that it makes it 
more likely.  
 
 A heuristic in psychology is an easy to compute method or “thumb rule” that 
people use when making decisions, develop beliefs or conclusions. Familiarity 
bias was built on the basis of the Tversky and Kahneman’s discovery of 
heuristic availability. It occurs when something is familiar and is preferred 
over new environment, people and things. Familiarity heuristic can be 
extended to different circumstances encountered by individuals in daily life. 
When these circumstances seem to be resembled to the previous, (in particular 
in case those individuals encounter a high cognitive load), they may revert to 
the state of mind they felt or acted beforehand. Whan and Parker (1981) report 
to their study that high familiarity with the features of an item that they want 
to buy made it possible to choose quicker and more confidently.   
 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were the first to refer loss aversion. It refers to 
investors who have the tendency to avoid losses rather than gain more. In fact, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) present that losses are psychologically twice as 
powerful as the gains.   
 
 
 Hirshleifer (2001), Optimism is an emotional bias that refers to someone who 
believes he is less likely to experience a negative situation. Owen (2015), 
mention that optimism bias is common in all gender, ages, and ethnicities.  
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 Sheppard et al. (2002), refer to the pessimism bias, when people believe 
regard themselves as worse off than others. Edelman (2010), refer that 
pessimism bias is a phenomenon in which people overstate the probability that 
bad things will happen to them.  
 
 Seiler et al. (2008) explain that sometimes people are dominated by the fear 
that their decisions will be wrong, and then they present regret aversion. These 
people might fear both omission errors as well as commission consequences. 
 
 Contreras and Contreras (2019) refer that traders many times having access to 
the same public information (or similar private information) react in a similar 
way and adopt resemble investment decisions. Bikchandani and Sharma 
(2000) refer to herding and the several reasons that an investor could be 
influenced by others. In fact, imitation is more preferable from investors in 
order to achieve conformity that means they try to decrease volatility.  
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2.2 Investor sentiment in the stock market 
 
There are many problems in the financial sector, such as the drop of liquidity, the 
devaluation of assets as well as many unexpected fluctuations in the stock markets. As 
a result, several concerns arose leading to the conclusion that neoclassical financial 
theory is not always able to explain how financial markets actually work. The entire 
situation forced fund managers, investors and other people interested in investments 
to focus on a behavioural approach in order to better understand and describe the 
recent global financial crisis and its aftermath. 
 
Many events in the economic history refer to the dramatic changes in stock prices, for 
example the Great Crash of 1929, the Black Monday crash in 1987, as well as the 
Dot.com bubble in 1990s and currently the global financial crisis. In standard finance 
theory is considered that rational investors constantly force capital market prices to 
the present value of predictable future cash flows and has substantial difficulty to 
appropriately explain these patterns.  
 
Many researchers in Behavioral Finance have hence been trying to supplement the 
standard financial model with another model which is based on two assumptions. 
Delong, Shleifer Summer and Waldmann (1990) laid out the first assumption that 
investors are subject to sentiment. It is broadly defined as a belief about future cash 
flows and investment risks that the facts at hand do not justify. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) emphasized in the second assumption, in which betting against sentimental 
investors is both costly and risky. Consequently, rational investors or arbitrageurs as 
commonly called, are not as successful as the standard model would indicate in 
pushing prices to their fundamental values.  
 
Current stock market history has collaborated suitably, in case of the Internet bubble 
(1990s) and the following NASDAQ as well as telecom crashes, so the two basis 
theories of Behavioral Finance are validated. In the late1990s, it was noticed an 
unpredictable wave of investor sentiment forced the prices of speculative and hard-to-
value stocks in technology to unknown points creating a bubble. 
 
 
12 
Many of innovative and well-known studies about stock market returns and investor 
sentiment are presented in 1980s testing the possibility of mispricing the stock market 
as a whole in different ways. Researchers tried to find the tendency of returns to 
reverse to the mean, volatility in aggregate stock index returns that could not be 
proved by fundamental volatility, which is actually a different way of symbolising 
mean reversal in returns; or expectedness of aggregate returns using simple estimation 
ratios such as the ratio of aggregate dividends to stock market value. Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) used interim advances in the theory of Behavioral Finance to supply 
more acute testing of sentiment appearance. Inspired by DeLong, Summers, Shleifer 
and Waldmann (1990) particularly, appeared two types of investors in the models; 
rational investors who are sentiment-free as well as irrational traders who tend to 
follow exogenous sentiment. Prices are not always at their fundamental values and 
mispricing occurs from the combination of two factors: an alteration in feeling on the 
part of the irrational traders, and limits to arbitrage.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) imply that external events can lead investor sentiment and 
consequently the whole stock market. In that case these beliefs can translate into 
observable patterns of recorded securities trading. Liquidity and more specifically 
trading volume could be represented as an investor sentiment index. Baker and Stein 
(2004), report that it is more expected from irrational investor to trade in a short-
selling position which is more expensive than the closing long position; this would 
happen as he is pessimistic and bets on dropping stocks. At the end, Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2003), point out that volume shows fundamental differences of opinion which 
are associated with the rates of valuation whereas short selling is not so easy and 
market turnover is a simple approximation for this term, i.e. the ratio of trading 
volume to the number of stocks that listed in the stock market.  
 
2.3 Stock Volatility Indices  
 
Gastineau (1977) initially suggested volatility indices and then followed Cox and 
Rubinstein (1985), Brenner and Galai (1989), and also Whaley (1993). Brenner and 
Galai (1989) suggest the development of a volatility index based on historical 
volatility, implied and historical volatility indicators for stock, bond, as well as 
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foreign exchange markets. Presently there are many volatility indexes being 
maintained and distributed such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
Market Volatility Index (VIX), the CBOE Nasdaq-100 Volatility Index (VXN), the 
German Volatility Index (VDAX), and the UK Volatility Index Series (FTSE) etc. In 
addition, Dowling and Muthuswamy (2003) developed a volatility index for the 
Australian market nominated as AVIX adapted from implied volatilities on the 
Australian Stock Exchange index options (S&P/ASX200). Skiadopoulos (2004) also 
proposed a volatility index for the Greek option market volatility index (GVIX); 
although such indexes are not maintained or transmitted in real time to the best of our 
knowledge. 
 
2.4 The negative relationship of the volatility index with the stock market 
 
In this section the relationship of stock market returns and volatility is briefly 
documented and explained. More specifically, it is well known that returns relate 
positively to past volatility, although they relate negatively to current volatility. This 
happens as, according to Guo (2002), past variance is positively related to returns as it 
provides information about conditional risk. On the other hand, the contemporary 
relationship between returns and risk is negative because of a volatility reaction; for 
this reason a current positive innovation in variance implies higher future expected 
variance, therefore higher expected future returns.  
 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) introduced the capital asset pricing model CAPM, 
which was the cornerstone of the asset pricing theory that proposed a powerful and 
easy to understand framework of measuring risk and its relation with expected return. 
Moreover, academics such as Christie (1982), Black (1976), and others have also 
studied, the empirical relation among stock market returns and volatility, and have 
also documented the clear negative relationship between returns and ex post volatility. 
Additionally, Black (1976) and Schwert (1989, 1990) presented the asymmetry of this 
relationship, while providing empirical evidence that an increase in expected volatility 
for a given negative return is bigger than a respective reduction in expected volatility 
associated with an equal positive stock market return.  
 
14 
 
Furthermore, there is strong evidence on a strong asymmetric negative relationship 
among the changes of the implied volatility index and the underlying index returns. 
Through the years many researchers have attempted to explain the negative 
asymmetric effect of the stock market returns on the VIX index, using a behavioral 
explanation. Whaley (2000), Giot (2005), Carr and Wu (2006) identified the 
statistically significant negative asymmetric relation among the VIX and S&P 500 
returns. Low (2004) based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979), was the first who 
provided a behavioral explanation of loss-aversion. Hibbert et al. (2008) extend 
Low’s (2004) study. Hibbert et al. (2008) investigated the relationship among CBOE 
VIX (NASDAQ volatility index) changes and also S&P500 (NASDAQ) returns, used 
daily and also intraday data for the periods 1998–2006, and also examined the data for 
the period 2001–2006. Through their paper they signified the superiority of the VIX 
index over alternative volatility measures that document a significantly negative 
asymmetric relationship that can be better justified by the behavioral explanations that 
they provide based on heuristic representativenes,and heuristic impact,.  
 
Furthermore, Park (2011) also relates the asymmetric relationship to the stock 
market’s asymmetric herding behavior, providing an alternative interpretation of 
behavior. Smales (2014, 2016), also confirmed that VIX has a negative relationship to 
news sentiment with this relationship being asymmetric and more extreme after 
negative news was released. Badshah (2013) verifies that the behavioral explanations 
(heuristics of effect and representativeness) are superior to fundamental explanations. 
Badshah (2013) using many different volatility indexes from different markets 
identified that the VIX presents the highest asymmetric return-volatility in 
relationship with its respective stock market index. This negative relationship between 
volatility indexes and their respective stock market index has also been identified in 
other stock exchange markets; for instance Siriopoulos and Fassas (2008) present the 
negative asymmetric relationship that exists between VFTSE and FTSE-100. Against 
to this, it has been described a clear contemporary negative relationship that is not 
asymmetric among VDAX-NEW and DAX 30 index (González and Novales, 2009). 
In addition, Dichtl and Drobetz (2012) argue that the negative relationship between 
DAX returns and VDAX returns is more pronounced than in the case of positive DAX 
returns. Tallau (2012) also identifies a stronger increase in VDAX after negative 
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DAX returns compared to the decrease in VDAX due to positive DAX returns. Velev 
et al. (2016) investigate 12 stock indexes from US, Asia Pacific and also European 
Union stock exchange as well as their respective implied volatility indexes in order to 
document the asymmetric short-term volatility behavior in the event of negative price 
changes. In spite of this, in a long-run line this asymmetry disappears with the idea of 
long term market equilibrium. Moreover, there are several studies that examine other 
stock exchanges, such as, Skiadopoulos (2004) for the Greek stock exchange, 
Dowling and Muthuswamy (2005) for the Australian stock exchange (with no 
evidence of asymmetry, although there is a negative correlation), Ting (2007) for the 
Korean market, and Giner and Morini (2004), Gonzalez and Vovales (2007) for the 
Spanish stock exchange. Most of them document an asymmetric effect, but all of 
them identify a strong negative correlation among the implied volatility index and the 
respective stock exchange returns. Economou, Panagopoulos and Tsouma (2018), 
mostly focus on the implied volatility employing the VIX index for the US market for 
the period 2000 to 2004, as well as for FTSE 100, DAX 30 and respectively their 
implied volatility indexes FTSE volatility index and VDAX new volatility index. This 
paper provides evidence of asymmetry as the fear indicator reacts to the stock market.  
 
Wasterhoff (2004) presents that stock market prices could be considerably affected by 
sentiments like greed and fear. Chira et al. (2013) present that during the global 
financial crisis as the market fear increased there was an important effect on bank 
stocks’ returns. Galariotis et al. (2016) indicate that in Credit Default Swaps spread, 
the emotions of investors play an important role during the crisis with many practical 
consequences.  
 
Taking into account all the previous facts it is easier to understand that investor 
sentiment may lead to significant market fluctuations, particularly during market 
crisis periods when investors are more vulnerable to be affected by emotion.  
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3. Sample Period and Research approach 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this study was taken from yahoo finance 
(https://finance.yahoo.com/), investing.com as well as Bloomberg, and included daily 
closing index prices for the CBOE VIX index and the S&P 500 index from January 
2000 until October 2019.  
Focusing on the CBOE VIX index, this is an implied volatility index constructed by 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange in order to provide a measure of the expected 
short-term volatility of the US stock exchange based on the prices of S&P 500 Index 
call and put options. This is a widely recognised index that captures investor 
sentiment and fear in the stock market. Graph 1 presents the evolution of the VIX 
index from January 2000 to October 2019. 
 
 
Graph 1. VIX time plot (January 2000 – October 2019) (Source: 2019 yahoo finance) 
  
The S&P 500 index or in other words Standard & Poor’s 500 Index is widely 
regarded as the best single gauge of large-cap US equities as well as serves as the 
basis for a great variety of investment products. 500 leading companies are included 
in this index. This index captures approximately 80% of the available market 
capitalization ($25.6 trillion), the number of members is 500, and the currency is US 
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dollars (Bloomberg 2019, Wikipedia 2019). Graph 2 presents the evolution of the 
S&P 500 index from January 2000 to October 2019. 
 
 
Graph 2. S&P 500 time plot (January 2000 – October 2019) (Source: 2019 yahoo 
finance) 
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
For the investigation of the relation between the behavior of an investor and the 
course of major stock markets we adopted the methodology of Hibbert, Daigler and 
Dupoyet (2008). Based on their work, we employed two regression models as 
follows: 
%ΔVIXt = a0 + a1·Rt + εt                                                               (M1) 
%ΔVIXt = a0 + a1·Dup·Rt + a2·(1-Dup)·Rt + εt                              (M2) 
Model M1 describes the linear relation between is the percentage change in the 
investigated index at time t, and Rt is the contemporaneous daily percentage change in 
the return of investment of the underlying index. The second model uses the same 
idea with the addition of a dummy variable called Dup This variable, will take the 
value of 1 if Rt > 0 and 0 otherwise. Model M2 enables the examination of an 
asymmetric relationship in line with previous literature as presented in Section 2. In 
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line with prospect theory we expect an asymmetric negative relationship that is 
stronger during down market days. This implies that the impact of negative market 
returns regarding investor fear is stronger compared to the positive effect of an 
upward market. Moreover the aim of this study is to explore whether this relationship 
has changed over the years, before, during and after the global financial crisis, thus 
indicating a change in investor behavior in the US market. In fact, the sub-periods 
under examination are: 2000-2003 (in 2003 the new VIX methodology was launced), 
2004-2006 (the period before the global financial crisis), 2007-2009 (the period of the 
global financial crisis), and 2010-10/2019 (the period after the global financial crisis 
up today). 
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4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Introductory analysis  
 
The analysis of the data includes the presentation of the properties of the data 
thorough descriptive statistics. This description is based on tables of measures of 
central tendency and dispersion as well as accompanying graphs. The second step of 
the analysis includes the investigation of two regression models, M1 and M2. The 
statistical package that was used to carry out the analysis was EViews V9 
(eviews.com) a p-level of 0.05 was used in all tests to determine statistical 
significance.   
 
According to table 1, positive mean values were found in periods 2000-2003, 2007-
2009 and 2010-10/2019, as well as for the whole period under examination for the 
VIX index and 2004-2006, 2010-10/2019 for the S&P500 index. All indexes 
presented large volatility (large standard deviation), regardless the investigated 
period. Median deviates from mean values in cases revealing possible asymmetry of 
the sample and deviation from the normal distribution. Moreover, Jarque-Berra test of 
normality was found statistically significant (p < 0.001) in all cases, thus rejecting the 
null hypothesis of normality, with the exception of the S&P 500 for the period 2004-
2006. The answer for this kind of behavior among the indexes is partially explained 
from graphs 1 and 2, showing that all indexes presented a large number of outliers, in 
all the investigated periods.  
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Table 1. Measures of central tendency and dispersion of VIX and S&P500 indexes by 
period (percentage changes) 
 VIX SP500 VIX SP500 
 
Period: 2000 - 2003 Period: 2004 – 2006 
 Mean 0.108054 -0.017282 0.083516 0.034410 
 Median -0.223970 -0.022779 -0.488599 0.073812 
 Maximum 31.15577 5.732729 30.85554 2.156500 
 Minimum -15.58492 -5.827794 -25.90866 -1.832632 
 Std. Dev. 5.254969 1.383018 5.427844 0.659363 
 Skewness 0.537967 0.211013 0.709806 0.002591 
 Kurtosis 4.566519 4.324592 6.374244 3.249893 
 Jarque-Bera 150.9354 80.76868 421.5676 1.965302 
 Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.374317 
 Sum 108.3777 -17.33395 63.05455 25.97956 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 27669.93 1916.564 22213.96 327.8091 
 Observations 1003 1003 755 755 
 VIX SP500 VIX SP500 
 
Period: 2007 - 2009 Period: 2010 – 10/2019 
 Mean 0.357622 -0.014050 0.294677 0.044467 
 Median -0.668575 0.086790 -0.579171 0.057439 
 Maximum 64.21524 11.58004 115.5979 4.959374 
 Minimum -24.68364 -9.034978 -29.57265 -6.663446 
 Std. Dev. 7.614511 1.884965 8.231967 0.936556 
 Skewness 1.424844 0.059092 2.268001 -0.401460 
 Kurtosis 11.06423 9.308209 22.69054 7.361255 
 Jarque-Bera 2304.304 1253.935 42122.19 2028.796 
 Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
 Sum 270.3619 -10.62210 729.6200 110.1011 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 43775.48 2682.586 167719.1 2170.913 
 Observations 756 756 2476 2476 
 VIX SP500 
 2000-10/2019 
 Mean  0.233072  0.021874 
 Median -0.492611  0.053898 
 Maximum  115.5979  11.58004 
 Minimum -29.57265 -9.034978 
 Std. Dev.  7.238655  1.193130 
 Skewness  2.006354 -0.036786 
 Kurtosis  21.50209  11.75068 
 Jarque-Bera  74508.48  15919.04 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  1162.797  109.1296 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  261361.8  7100.714 
 Observations  4989  4989 
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4.2 Further investigation  
 
The synopsis results of the implementation of models 1 and 2 are presented in tables 2 
(for model 1) and 3 (for model 2), whereas total results are presented in the 
appendices. According to the results of table 2 model 1 there was a negative 
statistically significant relationship in all 4 investigated time periods and over the 
whole period under examination (p<0.001), as expected. The interpretability of the 
models varied from 55.79% to 63.13%. The model with the highest interpretability 
(Adj. R
2
=63.13%) referred to the time period 2004-2006 and the models with the 
lowest interpretability for the time period 2007-2009 (Adj. R
2
=55.79%). Finally, the 
model which described the whole period under examination presented interpretability 
equal to 51.97%.  
 
All of the produced models revealed a negative relation between the dependent and 
the independent variable in the form of  Δ              , where α is the 
coefficient of the equation which was found statistically significant in all cases. In 
fact, it seems that this relationship gets stronger before and after the global financial 
crisis, i.e. investor sentiment presents stronger reaction to the stock market returns.   
 
Table 2. Results of model 1 by period.  
 2000-10/2019 2000-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-10/2019 
C 
0.3287 
(5.43) 
0.0056 
(0.59) 
0.3086 
(3.17) 
0.3152 
(2.03) 
0.6048 
(6.68) 
SP500 
-4.3744 
(-19.16) 
-2.9565 
(-25.51) 
-6.5433 
(-20.21) 
-3.0189 
(-13.18) 
-6.9846 
(-23.24) 
Adjusted R-squared 51.97% 60.50% 63.13% 55.79% 63.12% 
S.E. of regression 5.01 3.30 3.29 5.06 4.99 
F-statistic 5400.027 1536.044 1292.173 953.80 4236.160 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. 
 
The summary results for the implementation of model 2 are presented in table 3 and 
the total results in the appendices. As in the previous case, all coefficients were found 
statistically significant (p<0.001). The models’ interpretability varied from 57.69% 
(2007-2009) to 65.14% (2010-10/2019). The empirical results revealed again a 
negative relation between the dependent and the independent variables as follows: 
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 Δ                                 , where α1 and α2 coefficients 
were statistically significant in all cases. There is clear evidence of asymmetric 
investor behavior with its response being stronger during down market days compared 
to up market days
1
. In fact, this asymmetry seems to be stronger before and after the 
global financial crisis. The fact that the relationship gets stronger after the global 
financial crisis reveals a change in investor reaction to changes in the stock market, 
with investors being more sensitive to negative market returns after they had 
experienced the global financial crisis. 
 
Table 3. Results of model 2 by period.  
 2000-10/2019 2000-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-10/2019 
C 
-0.4777 
(-4.14) 
-0.6863 
(-4.38) 
-0.5532 
(-2.95) 
-0.5788 
(-2.99) 
-0.5157 
(-3.22) 
DUP*SP500 
-3.3359 
(-19.17) 
-2.2702 
(-14.44) 
-4.8972 
(-11.47) 
-2.2675 
(-11.91) 
-5.1624 
(-21.27) 
(1-DUP)*SP500 
-5.3646 
(-14.83) 
-3.6908 
(-18.13) 
-8.2756 
(-15.59) 
-3.7193 
(-10.68) 
-8.6225 
(-16.70) 
Adjusted R-squared 53.52% 61.95% 64.77% 57.69% 65.14% 
S.E. of regression 4.9348 3.2411 3.2215 4.9593 4.8600 
F-statistic 2873.28 817.00 694.22 513.43 2312.816 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. 
  
                                                 
1
 This is confirmed by means of Wald test in all cases. 
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Conclusions 
This study attempted to provide an introduction to Behavioral Finance and 
empirically investigates investor sentiment captured by the well-known US fear 
indicator, i.e. the VIX index in four different periods; from 2000 until 2003, 2004 to 
2006 (pre-crisis), 2007 to 2009 (during the global financial crisis), and finally 2010 
until nowadays October 2019 (after the financial crisis). 
 
Through this analysis with a literature review it presents that the economic theory 
with a combination of psychology science create a new promising field that has 
registered vital progress within the last decades and  highlights the psychological 
factors in the investors’ decision-making process.  
 
The empirical results document a robust negative relationship between the fear index 
and the stock market index both for the whole period under examination and the sub-
periods examined, as expected based on previous literature. Furthermore, this 
relationship is asymmetric, i.e. it is stronger during down market days compared to up 
market days, as expected by previous literature. Testing for different sub-periods to 
identify changes in investor behavior before, during and after the global financial 
crisis this asymmetry seems to be stronger before as well as after the global financial 
crisis. In fact, the relationship being stronger after the crisis reveals a change in 
investor behavior with investors being more sensitive to negative market returns after 
the devastating and unprecedented experience of the global financial crisis. 
 
Overall, this study indicates the significant role of investor sentiment in the 
investment environment and provides useful results for market participants. Future 
research should focus on the investigation of alternative sentiment indicators and 
possible changes of investor behavior in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.  
Finally, in this study are not inferred any other independent variables for example 
confidence, loss aversion, anxiety and others factors that could also be helpful to 
understand better their market participants’ decisions. For this reason it might be 
interesting to extend this investigation in the same or other stock markets for example 
in the German Stock Exchange or the London Stock Exchange, in the same periods 
with other psychological factors that drive the capital markets.   
 
24 
References 
 
 Areal N., (2008), “FTSE-100 implied volatility index” School of Economics 
and Management University of Minho 4710-057 Braga Portugal. 
 Aussenegg W., Goetz L., and Jelic R., (2013), “European ‘fear’ indices-
evidence before and during the financial crisis” Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2267903 
 Badshah I. U., (2013), “ Quantile Regression Analysis of the Asymmetric 
Return Volatility Relation” J. Futures Mark vol. 33(3) p.235-265 
 Baker M. and Stein J., (2004), “Market liquidity as a sentiment indicator” 
Journal of Financial Markets vol. 7(3) p.271-299. 
 Baker M. and Wurgler J., (2006), “Investor Sentiment and the Cross- Section 
of Stock Returns” Journal of Finance, vol. 61(4) p.1645-80. 
 Baker M., and Wurgler J., (2007), “Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 21(2) p.129–151. 
 Baker K. H. and Nofsinger J.R., (2010), “ Behavioral Finance: Investors, 
Corporations and Markets”  
 Barberis N., Shleifer A. and Vishny R., (1998), “A Model of Investor 
Sentiment” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 49(3) p.307-43. 
 Barber B. and Odean T., (2000), “Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The 
common stock investment performance of individual investors” The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 55(2), p.773-806. 
 Barber B. and Odean T., (2001), “Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence 
and common stock investment” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 
116(1) p. 261-292. 
 Bikhchandani, S. and Sharma, S., (2000), “ Herd behavior in financial 
markets” IMF Staff papers vol.47(3) p.279-310 
 Black F., (1976), “The Pricing of Commodity Contracts” Journal of Financial 
Economics vol.3 p.167-179.  
 Brenner M., and Galai D., (1989), “New financial instruments for hedging 
changes in volatility” Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 45(4) p.61–65. 
 
25 
 Carr P. and Wu L., (2006), “A Tale of Two Indices” Journal of Derivatives 
vol.13 p.13-29. 
 CBOE, (2003), “The VIX white paper”, Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 Christie A., (1982), “The Stochastic Behavior of Common Stock Variances: 
Value, Leverage and Interest Rate Effects” Journal of Financial Economics 
vol. 10 p.407-432. 
 Contreras A. and Contreras C., (2019), “Herding in financial markets: Why do 
financial investors herd?” Instituto Español de Analistas Financieros (IEAF). 
 Cox, J. C. and Rubinstein, M (1985), “Options Markets”, vol. 15 of Fleming et 
al. (1995). 
 D’ Avolio G., (2002), “The Market for Borrowing Stock” Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 66(2-3) p.271-306. 
 Daniel K., Hirshleifer D., and Subrahmanyam A., (1998), “Investor 
Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions.” Journal of 
Finance, vol.53(6) p.839–85 
 De Long Bradford J., Shleifer A.,  Summers L., and Waldmann R., (1990), 
“Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
98(4) p.703-38 
 Dichtl H. and Drobetz W., (2012), “Zur Rendite-Risiko-Beziehung am 
deutschen Aktienmarkt” Kredit und Kapital vol.45 p.373–406. 
 Dowling S., and Muthuswamy J., (2003), “The implied volatility of Australian 
index options” Reserve Bank of Australia and University of Sydney, p.1–37. 
 Dhaoui A., Bourouis S. and Boyacioglu M. A., (2013), “The Impact of 
Investor Psychology on Stock Markets: Evidence from France” Journal of 
Academic Research in Economics. 
 Dhaoui A., (2013), “Animal Spirits and Trading Volume in International 
Financial Markets between 2002 and 2011” Journal of Economic and Social 
Studies. 
 Economou F., Panagopoulos Y. and Tsouma E.,(2018),“Uncovering 
asymmetries in the relationship between fear and the stock market using a 
hidden co-integration approach” Research in International Business and 
Finance vol.44 p.459–470 
 Edelman R., (2010), “ The Truth About Money” 4th Edition p.230 
 
26 
 Festinger L., Riecken W. H., and Schachter S., (1956),“When Prophecy Fails: 
A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the 
Destruction of the World” University of Minnesota Press 
 Fleming J., Ostdiek B., and Whaley R. E., (1995) “Predicting stock market 
volatility: a new measure” Journal of Futures Markets, vol. 15(3) p.265–302. 
 Gastineau G., (1977), “An Index of Listed Option Premiums” Financial 
Analysts Journal, vol. 33(3) p.70–75. 
 Gervais S. and Odean T., (2001), “Learning to be overconfident” Review of 
Financial Studies, vol. 14(1) p.1-27. 
 Giot P., (2005), “Relationships between implied volatility indexes and stock 
index returns” Journal of Portfolio Management vol. 31 p.92-100. 
 Guo H., (2002), “Stock Market Returns, Volatility, and Future Output” 
Review Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis vol. 84(5) p.75-84. 
 Handerson P. W. and Paterson R. W., (1992), “ Mental accounting and 
categorization”  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes vol. 
51(1) p.92-117 
 Heath C. and Soll J. B., (1996), “Mental Budgeting and Consumer Decision” 
Journal of Consumer Research vol. 23(1) p.40-52. 
 Hibbert A. M., Daigler R. T. and Dupoyet B., (2008), “a Behavioral 
Explanation for the Negative Asymmetric Return- Volatility Relation” Journal 
of Banking & Finance vol. 32 p.2254-2266. 
 Hirshleifer D., (2001), “Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing” The journal of 
Finance vol.56 (4) p.1533-1597. 
 Kahneman D., and Tversky, A., (1972), “Subjective probability: A judgment 
of representativeness” Cognitive Psychology vol. 3(3) p. 430-454.  
 Kahneman D., and Tversky, A., (1979), “Prospect theory: An analysis of 
decision under risk. Econometrica, vol.47(2) p.263–292 
 Kahneman D., Slovic P. and Tversky A., (1982), “Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”. Cambridge University Press p.153-163 
 Kahneman D. and Tversky A. , (1992), “Advances in prospect theory: 
Cumulative representation of uncertainty” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 
vol. 5(4) p.297-323 
 
27 
 Kennedy M., (2019), “Investment and exchange rate” The balance 
(https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-stock-index-1214812), June 25, 2019. 
 Lintner J., (1965), “The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky 
Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets” Review of Economics 
and Statistics vol. 47(1) p.13-37. 
 Low C., (2004), “The fear and Exuberance from Implied Volatility of S&P100 
Index Options” Journal of Business vol.77 p.527-546. 
 Mackay C., (1841), “Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of 
Crowds”. 
 MacKay C., (1980), “Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of 
Crowds” New York, NY, Crown Publishing Group 
 Mahajan J., (1992), “The Overconfidence Effect in Marketing Management 
Predictions”, Journal of Marketing Research vol. 29(3) p.329-342. 
 Markowitz H. M., (1959), “Theory of rational option pricing” Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science vol. 4 p.141-183.  
 Miller E. M., (1977), “Risk, Uncertainty and Divergence of Opinion” Journal 
of Finance vol. 32(4) p.1151-68. 
 Odean T., (1998), “Volume, volatility, price and profit when all traders are 
above average” The Journal of Finance vol. 53(6) p.1887-1934 
 Odean T., (1998), “Are investors reluctant to realize losses?” The Journal of 
Finance vol. 53(5) p.1279-1298. 
 Owen P. O., (2015), “The neural bases of always looking on the bright side” 
Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences vol. 8(1) p.11-15. 
 Park B. J., (2011), “Asymmetric herding as source of asymmetric return 
volatility” J. Bank. Finance vol.35 p.2657–2665. 
 Pompian M., (2011), “Behavioral Finance and Wealth Management: How to 
Build Optimal Portfolios That Account for Investor Biases” Second Edition, 
Wiley Finance Publications. 
 Pontiff J., (1996), “Costly Arbitrage: Evidence from Closed-End Funds”. 
Quarterly  Journal of Economics vol. 111(4) p.1135-51. 
 Qawi B. R., (2010), “Behavioral Finance: Is Investor Psyche Driving Market 
Performance?” Georgia State University – Robinson College of Business, 
Atlanta, GA. 
 
28 
 Raiffa H.,(1968), “Decision Analysis : Introductory Lectures on Choices under 
Uncertainty” Reading MA: Addison Wesley  
 Ricciardi V. and Simon K. H., (2000), “What is Behavioral Finance”, 
Business, Education and Technology Journal.  
 Ritter J.R, (2003), “Behavioral finance” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal vol. 
11(4) p.429-437. 
 Scheinkman J. and Xiong W., (2003), “Overconfidence and Speculative 
Bubbles” Scheinkman, José and Xiong, Wei, Overconfidence and Speculative 
Bubbles. 13th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference; AFA 2003 
Washington, DC Meetings. 
 Schwert G. W., (1989), “Why does Stock Market Volatility Change over 
Time?” Journal of Finance vol.44 p.1115-1154. 
 Schwert G. W., (1990), “Stock Volatility and the crash of 1987” Review of 
Financial Studies vol.3 p.77-102. 
 Seiler M., Seiler V., Traub S. and Harrison D., (2008), “Regret aversion and 
false reference points in residential real estate” Journal of Real Estate 
Research vol.30(4) p.461-474. 
 Sharpe W. F., (1964), “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium 
Under Conditions of Risk, Journal of Finance vol. 19 p.425-442. 
 Shefrin H. and Statman M., (1994), “Behavioral Capital Asset Pricing Theory” 
Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis vol. 29(3) p.323-349. 
 Shefrin H., (2000), “Beyond Greed and Fear”, Boston, Massachusetts: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
 Shefrin H. and Statman M., (2000), “Behavioral Portfolio Theory”, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis vol. 35(2) p.127-151. 
 Shepperd J. A., Carroll P., Grace J. and Terry M., (2002), “ Exploring the 
Causes of Comparative Optimism” , Psychologica Belgica vol.42 p.65-98 
 Shiller J.R., (2003), “From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance” 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17(1) p.83-104. 
 Shleifer A., and Vishny R., (1997), “The Limits of Arbitrage” journal of 
Finance, vol. 52(1) p.35-55.  
 Siriopoulos C., and Fassas A., (2008), “The information content of VFTSE”. 
 
29 
 Skiadopoulos G., (2004), “The Greek implied volatility index: construction 
and properties” Applied Financial Economics, vol. 14(16) p.1187–1196. 
 Smales L. A.,(2016),“Investor Sentiment and Stock Market Returns” Applied 
Economics vol. 49 (34) p.3395-3421 
 Statman M., (1995), “Behavioral Finance vs. Standard Finance.” Behavioral 
Finance and Decision Theory in Investment Management, Charlottesville, 
p.14-22 
 Suryawanshi P. B., and Dr. Jumle G. A., (2016), “Comparison of Behavioral 
Finance and Traditional Finance: For Investment Decisions” IRACST – 
International Journal of Commerce, Business and Management (IJCBM), vol. 
5(3). 
 Thaler R., (1999), “Mental accounting matters” Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making vol. 12(3) p.183-206. 
 Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., (1973), “A heuristic for judging frequency 
and probability”, Cognitive Psychology vol. 5(2) p.207–232. 
 Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., (1974), “Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases”, Science, vol. 185(4157) p.1124–1131 
 Velev J.P., Payne B.C. Tresl J. and Toledo W., (2016), “Implied Volatility 
Around the World: Geographical Markets and Asset Classes” CERGE-EI 
Working Paper Series 
 Webster M., (2019), definition of fear available at: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/ 
 Whaley, R. E., (1993) “Derivatives on market volatility: hedging tools long 
overdue” Journal of Derivatives, vol. 1 p.71–84. 
 Whaley, R. E., (2000), “The investor fear gauge” Journal of Portfolio 
Management vol. 26 p.12-17. 
 Whan P. C. and Parker Lessig V., (1981), “ Familiarity and Its Impact on 
Consumer Decision Biases and Heuristics” Journal of Consumer Research 
vol.8(2) p.223-230 
 Wurgler J. and Zhuravskaya E., (2002), “Does Arbitrage Flatten Demand 
Curves for Stocks?” Journal of Business, vol. 74(4) p.583-609.  
 
 
 
30 
 
Databases 
 Bloomberg Database 
 Yahoo Finance 
 
Websites 
 https://www.myaccountingcourse.com/accounting-dictionary/stock-index 
 http://www.cboe.com 
 https://www.stern.nyu.edu 
 https://en.wikipedia.org 
 https://investinganswers.com 
 https://www.thebalance.com 
  https://www.boerse.de  
 https://www.investopedia.com 
 https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
31 
Appendix 
Regression results – Model 1  
Period=2000-2003 
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 1003    
Included observations: 1003   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 7.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.056959 0.095753 0.594853 0.5521 
SP500 -2.956515 0.115860 -25.51793 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.605446    Mean dependent var 0.108054 
Adjusted R-squared 0.605052    S.D. dependent var 5.254969 
S.E. of regression 3.302478    Akaike info criterion 5.229215 
Sum squared resid 10917.27    Schwarz criterion 5.239008 
Log likelihood -2620.452    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.232937 
F-statistic 1536.044    Durbin-Watson stat 2.091552 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 651.1650 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Period=2004-2006 
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1004 1758   
Included observations: 755   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth = 7.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.308671 0.097317 3.171799 0.0016 
SP500 -6.543315 0.323743 -20.21143 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.631816    Mean dependent var 0.083516 
Adjusted R-squared 0.631327    S.D. dependent var 5.427844 
S.E. of regression 3.295702    Akaike info criterion 5.225761 
Sum squared resid 8178.825    Schwarz criterion 5.238017 
Log likelihood -1970.725    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.230482 
F-statistic 1292.173    Durbin-Watson stat 2.225000 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 408.5019 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Period=2007-2009   
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 756   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
 bandwidth = 7.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.315205 0.154557 2.039407 0.0418 
SP500 -3.018901 0.228939 -13.18651 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.558497    Mean dependent var 0.357622 
Adjusted R-squared 0.557911    S.D. dependent var 7.614511 
S.E. of regression 5.062871    Akaike info criterion 6.084387 
Sum squared resid 19327.03    Schwarz criterion 6.096630 
Log likelihood -2297.898    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.089102 
F-statistic 953.8008    Durbin-Watson stat 2.302200 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 173.8840 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Period=2010-10/2019   
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 2475   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
 bandwidth = 9.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.604863 0.090452 6.687099 0.0000 
SP500 -6.984617 0.300533 -23.24076 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.631399    Mean dependent var 0.291314 
Adjusted R-squared 0.631250    S.D. dependent var 8.231930 
S.E. of regression 4.998819    Akaike info criterion 6.057088 
Sum squared resid 61795.80    Schwarz criterion 6.061786 
Log likelihood -7493.647    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.058795 
F-statistic 4236.160    Durbin-Watson stat 2.093828 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 540.1328 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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All periods  
 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.328759 0.060497 5.434294 0.0000 
SP500 -4.374440 0.228251 -19.16502 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.519882    Mean dependent var 0.233072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.519786    S.D. dependent var 7.238655 
S.E. of regression 5.016207    Akaike info criterion 6.063626 
Sum squared resid 125484.6    Schwarz criterion 6.066238 
Log likelihood -15123.72    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.064542 
F-statistic 5400.027    Durbin-Watson stat 2.140655 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 367.2980 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Regression results – Model 2  
All periods  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.477672 0.115476 -4.136543 0.0000 
DUP*SP500 -3.335894 0.173999 -19.17194 0.0000 
(1-DUP)*SP500 -5.364620 0.361722 -14.83077 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.535432    Mean dependent var 0.233072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.535246    S.D. dependent var 7.238655 
S.E. of regression 4.934800    Akaike info criterion 6.031103 
Sum squared resid 121420.3    Schwarz criterion 6.035020 
Log likelihood -15041.59    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.032476 
F-statistic 2873.276    Durbin-Watson stat 2.099290 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 231.9875 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Period = 2000-2003   
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares    
Included observations: 1003   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
bandwidth = 7.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.686390 0.156525 -4.385161 0.0000 
DUP*SP500 -2.270269 0.157181 -14.44365 0.0000 
(1-DUP)*SP500 -3.690866 0.203475 -18.13920 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.620350    Mean dependent var 0.108054 
Adjusted R-squared 0.619591    S.D. dependent var 5.254969 
S.E. of regression 3.241123    Akaike info criterion 5.192703 
Sum squared resid 10504.88    Schwarz criterion 5.207391 
Log likelihood -2601.141    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.198285 
F-statistic 817.0037    Durbin-Watson stat 2.048892 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 414.6379 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
34 
Period = 2004-2006 
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1004 1758   
Included observations: 755   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
bandwidth = 7.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.553259 0.187078 -2.957371 0.0032 
DUP*SP500 -4.897287 0.426668 -11.47799 0.0000 
(1-DUP)*SP500 -8.275652 0.530676 -15.59454 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.648673    Mean dependent var 0.083516 
Adjusted R-squared 0.647738    S.D. dependent var 5.427844 
S.E. of regression 3.221515    Akaike info criterion 5.181546 
Sum squared resid 7804.376    Schwarz criterion 5.199930 
Log likelihood -1953.034    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.188628 
F-statistic 694.2266    Durbin-Watson stat 2.207417 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 225.9348 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Period =2007-2009   
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 756   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
bandwidth = 7.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.578849 0.193107 -2.997562 0.0028 
DUP*SP500 -2.267531 0.190289 -11.91628 0.0000 
(1-DUP)*SP500 -3.719344 0.348162 -10.68279 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.576934    Mean dependent var 0.357622 
Adjusted R-squared 0.575811    S.D. dependent var 7.614511 
S.E. of regression 4.959317    Akaike info criterion 6.044374 
Sum squared resid 18519.91    Schwarz criterion 6.062739 
Log likelihood -2281.773    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.051448 
F-statistic 513.4326    Durbin-Watson stat 2.263289 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 105.9745 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Period =2010-10/2019   
   
Dependent Variable: VIX   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 2475   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
 bandwidth = 9.0000)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.515763 0.159844 -3.226669 0.0013 
DUP*SP500 -5.162442 0.242667 -21.27374 0.0000 
(1-DUP)*SP500 -8.622585 0.516031 -16.70943 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.651715    Mean dependent var 0.291314 
Adjusted R-squared 0.651433    S.D. dependent var 8.231930 
S.E. of regression 4.860095    Akaike info criterion 6.001204 
Sum squared resid 58389.93    Schwarz criterion 6.008252 
Log likelihood -7423.490    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.003764 
F-statistic 2312.816    Durbin-Watson stat 2.021098 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 392.6411 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
